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Worse than Punishment:  
How the Involuntary Commitment of Persons 
with Mental Illness Violates the  
United States Constitution 
by SAMANTHA M. CASPAR* & ARTEM M. JOUKOV** 
The most important deprivation of human and constitutional 
rights inflicted upon persons said to be mentally ill is involuntary 
mental hospitalization . . . 
– Dr. Thomas Szasz 
 
Individuals struggling with mental health ailments face many 
challenges, sometimes including the loss of liberty.  While incarceration in 
jail or prison may follow criminal misconduct, this is not the most imposing 
threat to liberty faced by persons with mental illness.  Instead, they must 
cope with the possibility of involuntary commitment to a treatment facility, 
a fate that may be worse than criminal incarceration.  While it may be 
necessary to commit some persons with mental illness that pose a danger, 
the current process for determining the appropriateness of involuntary 
commitment leaves many unshielded from the unbounded discretion of 
judges and doctors.  Because the terms of involuntary commitment are often 
unrestrained, the ability of those committed to obtain release or 
representation is minimal, and diagnosing mental health problems accurately 
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proves difficult.  This Article posits that both the United States Constitution 
and common sense should lead to far greater protections for persons with 
mental illness when these persons are faced with the danger of losing their 
liberty. 
Introduction 
Good intentions are often at the heart of laws that activists and 
politicians champion as protections for persons with mental illness.  These 
laws may include the ability to claim insanity as a defense to criminal 
accusations,1 the ability to have someone committed to an institution for their 
own protection,2 and the ability to deprive someone of their liberty in order 
to prevent them from harming others.3  Undoubtedly, these are noble 
purposes: it is important to protect individuals with mental illness from 
themselves in certain circumstances,4 and it is equally important to permit 
them to plead insanity if they commit a crime due to an irresistible impulse 
or an inability to contemplate its moral implications.5  The problem is that, 
over the years, the use of mental health treatment facilities to limit the 
freedom of persons with mental illness has not always benefited such 
persons.6 
Although many individuals in the United States suffer from mental 
illness, indefinite commitment to a mental health treatment facility might not 
be the best solution.7  In fact, misdiagnosis, the absence of adequate legal 
representation, and the lack of perceived credibility that often accompany 
confinement in a mental health treatment facility can result in the involuntary 
confinement of too many people for too long.8  Additionally, when compared 
to the fate suffered by individuals who commit the very crimes that 
confinement is supposed to prevent, people breaking the law often escape 
with far lighter sentences of incarceration than those locked in mental health 
institutions at the mercy of their doctors.9  When combined with the idea that 
a lower standard of proof is required for commitment than conviction,10 it is 
not difficult to see an impending catastrophe: confinement in a mental health 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006). 
 2.  Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
 3.  O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  See, e.g., Clark, 548 U.S. 735. 
 6.  Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United States, 7 PSYCHIATRY 
(EDGMONT) 30-40 (Oct. 2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3392176/.  
 7.  Civil Commitment and the Mental Health Care Continuum: Historical Trends and 
Principles for Law and Practice, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., 
https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/civil-commitment-continuum-of-care.pdf.  
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See, e.g., Mac McClelland, When ‘Not Guilty’ Is a Life Sentence, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE 
(Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/magazine/when-not-guilty-is-a-life-sentence.html. 
 10.  Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
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institution can be more likely and more severe than the punishment a convict 
would receive for similar misconduct.11 
Because individuals who are committed to mental health facilities 
against their will are often seized as a result of state laws (and often by state 
officials), the constitutional implications are grim.  While the United States 
Supreme Court has approved the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for 
determining whether an individual may be constitutionally confined, the 
passage of time and an updated understanding of psychology suggests that 
courts should revisit the rule.12  This is especially true given the Supreme 
Court’s concern regarding the commitment of individuals against their will 
absent proof of social harm.13 
Because commitment may last far longer than incarceration, few 
controls on the discretion of doctors and judges exist (such as maximum 
sentence limitations), and psychologists have routinely misdiagnosed 
perfectly sane people with serious mental illnesses,14 the Supreme Court 
should consider reversing its precedent regarding the standard of proof that 
is required to involuntarily commit persons with mental illness.  
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, states should reconsider their 
current due process provisions for individuals they seek to commit to ensure 
commitment is used as a last resort when judges and doctors are extremely 
confident that commitment is the only viable option to prevent disaster.  
Moreover, states should implement a constitutional limitation on the length 
of confinement prior to a rehearing. 
In addition to elevating the standards of proof for commitment and 
increasing limitations on the length of commitments, courts and legislatures 
alike should consider extending the right to a jury trial to individuals whose 
commitment is in question.  While jury trials require significant expense and 
effort, they should, theoretically, reduce the probability of a wrongful 
commitment.15  Furthermore, requiring the state to prove a case to an 
 
 11.  Maria Cramer, Worse Than Jail: Addicts Civilly Committed Say DOC Abused Them and 
Failed to Treat Them, BOSTON GLOBE (July 13, 2017, 8:56 PM), https://www.bostonglobe. 
com/metro/2017/07/13/worse-than-jail-addicts-civilly-committed-say-doc-abused-them-and-faile 
d-treat-them/1kzQdRdO6F4QeQuYUiP54J/story.html. 
 12.  O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (While the Supreme Court upheld this 
standard, it also held in favor of the confined, finding that the State of Florida violated the 
individual’s rights by confining him for 15 years.  The basis for confinement was a suspicion of 
paranoid schizophrenia, despite the fact that the individual was harmless.); see also Jones v. United 
States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); Addington, 441 U.S. at 418. 
 13.  Id.; see also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Foucha v. Lousiana, 504 U.S. 71 
(1992). 
 14.  McClelland, supra note 9; David L. Rosenhan, Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 
SCIENCE 250 (1973).  
 15.  Vicki G. Kaufman, The Confinement of Mabel Jones: Is There a Right to Jury Trial in 
Civil Commitment Proceedings?, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 103, 122 (2014); In re Jones, 339 So. 2d 
1117, 1119 (Fla. 1976) (“It is well recognized that unsupported allegations of insanity can have a 
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empaneled jury would increase public awareness of commitment hearings, 
the type of evidence these cases involve, and the questionable nature of some 
of this evidence.16  Such a requirement may also prompt greater effort on the 
part of counsel representing the government to prove his or her case, greater 
scrutiny by the experts involved, greater scrutiny of expert testimony, and 
perhaps even greater attentiveness from the judge and appellate courts.17 
Then, individuals facing liberty and property deprivations due to mental 
illness will receive at least similar protections as those who face such 
deprivations due to intentional misconduct.18 
Ultimately, this Article will explain that constitutionally mandated 
standards should be required to protect individuals who face losing their 
liberty due to the perceived threat of future harm.  While preventing 
individuals from harming themselves or others is an honorable goal, the state 
should only be able to intervene when the threat is truly imminent.  
Psychologists, judges, and government agents are poor prophets: their ability 
to predict some future, undetermined harm is quite limited and can serve as 
only a feeble justification for commitment.19  Therefore, the ability to 
commit individuals with fewer protections than those offered under criminal 
law and use a lower burden of proof without a jury is a powerful weapon of 
oppression that no government should wield.  Individuals who suffer from 
mental health problems can be particularly defenseless against an attack on 
 
detrimental effect upon the personal lives and careers of people.  It should not be left to the 
discretion of a single judge to make determinations of such allegations.”) (Boyd, J., dissenting); 
Peter J. Coughlan, In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and 
Strategic Voting, 94 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 375 (2000). 
 16.  145 A.L.R. 711 (1943); Quesnell v. State, 517 P.2d 568, 579 n.22 (Wash. 1974).  
 17.  145 A.L.R. 711; Quesnell, 517 P.2d at 579 n.22; Artem M. Joukov, Who’s the Expert? 
Frye and Daubert in Alabama, 47 CUMB. L. REV. 275 (2016) (demonstrating the scrutiny the rules 
of evidence require of experts both under federal and Alabama law).  
 18.  Kaufman, supra note 15. 
 19.  See, e.g., Jones, 339 So. at 1119 (“It is well recognized that unsupported allegations of 
insanity can have a detrimental effect upon the personal lives and careers of people.  It should not 
be left to the discretion of a single judge to make determinations of such allegations.”) (Boyd, J., 
dissenting); Nathaniel Morris, This Secret Experiment Tricked Psychiatrists into Diagnosing Sane 
People as Having Schizophrenia, WASH. POST (Jan. 1,  2018, 7:46 AM), https://www.washing 
tonpost.com/national/health-science/an-experiment-fooled-psychiatrists-into-treating-sane-peopl 
e-as-if-they-were-insane/2017/12/29/c6c9c3ea-d5f7-11e7-b62d-d9345ced896d_story.html; 
Rosenhan, supra note 14; Daniel Distant, John Montin Lawsuit: Sane Man Trapped in Mental 
Hospital for 20 Years, CHRISTIAN POST (July 15, 2014), https://www.christianpost.com/trends/ 
john-montin-lawsuit-sane-man-trapped-in-mental-hospital-for-20-years.html; Ketema Ross, I 
Spent Seven Years Locked in a Human Warehouse, POLITICO (Apr. 16,  2015), https://www. 
politico.com/magazine/story/2015/04/mental-institution-mental-health-policy-117061_full.html; 
McClelland, supra note 9; Logan Albright, Steven Soderbergh’s “Unsane” Exposes the Nightmare 
of Involuntary Commitment, FEE (Mar. 26, 2018), https://fee.org/articles/steven-soderberghs-
unsane-exposes-the-nightmare-of-involunary-commitment. 
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their liberty through criminal20 and civil law, and the current laws that permit 
potentially indefinite commitment of a person (who may not have even 
committed a single crime) reach too far.  Leaving these decisions in the hands 
of largely unsupervised state agents, who rarely face appeal, is an injustice 
to the afflicted, and this essentially unrestrained power must change. 
This Article will proceed in Part I by outlining the scope of the mental 
health problems across the United States to demonstrate the large number of 
people that these commitment procedures potentially impact.  In Part II, this 
Article will demonstrate the risks and benefits of commitment and the 
increasing connection between law and psychology.  Part III will outline the 
constitutional implications of using involuntary commitment, which 
sometimes proves to be a worse punishment than incarceration, to curtail the 
liberties of individuals under a lower standard of proof and with fewer 
safeguards and limitations on the length and intensity of treatment than those 
provided in the criminal justice system.  This Article will conclude by 
positing that constitutionally mandated bright-line rules may be necessary to 
prevent individuals with mental illness from being involuntarily committed. 
Part I: Mental Illness 
According to the National Alliance on Mental Illness, approximately 
one in five United States adults experiences a mental illness in any given 
year.21  Additionally, one in five American youths ages 13-18 experiences a 
mental disorder at some point during their adolescence.22  Roughly 6.3% of 
the United States population suffers from a “severe mental illness,” defined 
as a long-standing mental illness, typically psychosis, which may cause 
prolonged moderate-to-severe disability.23  To put these numbers in 
perspective, the number of American adults was approximately 253.2 
 
 20.  See William N. Clark & Artem M. Joukov, The Criminalization of America, 76 ALA. 
LAW. 225 (July 2015) (cited and quoted in Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 2008, 2008 
n.98 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)).  Republished by the Mises Institute (demonstrating how 
simple it for some prosecutors to convict an individual not suffering from any mental illnesses); 
see also Artem M. Joukov & Samantha M. Caspar, Wherefore is Fortunato? How the Corpus 
Delicti Rule Excludes Reliable Confessions, Helps the Guilty Avoid Responsibility, and Proves 
Inconsistent with Basic Evidence Principles, 41 AM. J. TRIAL. ADV. 459, 481, 522 (2018) (noting 
the large number of state and federal statutes that may lead to prosecution and discussing the 
possibility that confessions to crime may be easier to secure from a mentally ill defendant even 
when that defendant did not commit the crime). 
 21.  Mental Health by the Numbers, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS (2019), 
https://www.nami.org/learn-more/mental-health-by-the-numbers. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Daniel Yohanna, Deinstitutionalization of People with Mental Illness: Causes and 
Consequences, AMA JOURNAL OF ETHICS (Oct. 15, 2013), https://journalofethics.ama-assn. 
org/article/deinstitutionalization-people-mental-illness-causes-and-consequences/2013-10. 
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million in 2018,24 and nearly 15.9 million of these individuals endured a 
severe mental illness.25  Perhaps more astonishing, 46% of Americans will 
meet the criteria for a diagnosable mental health condition at some point in 
their lives, and half of these individuals will develop a mental health 
condition by the age of 14.26  Mental illnesses include anxiety disorders, 
trauma-and-stressor-related disorders, eating disorders, mood disorders, and 
schizophrenia, among others.27  Many of these illnesses have the potential to 
result in criminal misconduct, and hence may increase government scrutiny 
of sufferers prior to and subsequently to criminal conduct. 
Anxiety disorders include generalized anxiety disorder, panic attacks 
and panic disorder, and specific phobia disorders.28  Psychologists define 
generalized anxiety disorder as a persistent state of increased anxiety and 
apprehension, characterized by heightened worrying, fear, and dread.29  
Generalized anxiety disorder affects approximately 3% of the U.S. 
population within a one-year period.30  A panic attack is the sudden onset of 
a brief period of intense anxiety, fear, or discomfort, accompanied by 
physical or emotional symptoms.31  An individual suffering from a panic 
attack may have a fear of dying, a fear of going “crazy” or losing control, 
depersonalization symptoms, chest pain or discomfort, shortness of breath, 
and nausea.32  Panic attacks affect nearly 11% of the population in a single 
year and may cause panic disorder, which is the occurrence of repeated panic 
attacks, accompanied by fears about future attacks or changes in behavior to 
avoid certain situations that may predispose the individual to attacks.33  
 
 24.  Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/ 
table/US/PST045217. 
 25.  Yohanna, supra note 23. 
 26.  Quick Facts and Statistics About Mental Health, MENTAL HEALTH AMERICA (2019), 
https://staging.mhanational.org/mentalhealthfacts. 
 27.  Michael B. First, Overview of Mental Illness, MERCK MANUAL (2017), https://www. 
merckmanuals.com/home/mental-health-disorders/overview-of-mental-health-care/overview-of-
mental-illness. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  John W. Barnhill, Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), MERCK MANUAL (2018), 
https://www.merckmanuals.com/professional/psychiatric-disorders/anxiety-and-stressor-related-
disorders/generalized-anxiety-disorder-gad; Michael B. First, Specific Phobia Disorders, MERCK 
MANUAL (2019), https://www.merckmanuals.com/professional/psychiatric-disorders/anxiety-and-
stressor-related-disorders/specific-phobic-disorders. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  John W. Barnhill, Panic Attacks and Panic Disorder, MERCK MANUAL (2018), 
https://www.merckmanuals.com/professional/psychiatric-disorders/anxiety-and-stressor-related-
disorders/panic-attacks-and-panic-disorder. 
 32.  Understanding Panic Attack – Symptoms, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/anxiety-
panic/understanding-panic-attack-symptoms (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
 33.  Barnhill, Panic Attacks and Panic Disorder, supra note 31. 
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Overall, anxiety disorders are more common than any other mental health 
disorder, affecting approximately 15% of U.S. adults.34 
Trauma-and-stressor-related disorders involve exposures to traumatic 
or stressful events.35  Trauma-and-stressor-related disorders include acute 
stress disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder.36  Acute stress disorder 
generally manifests after an individual experiences a traumatic event directly 
(such as a serious injury or death threat) or indirectly (such as witnessing 
events happening to others), and may cause depression, sleep disturbance, 
hypervigilance, or flashbacks.37  Post-traumatic stress disorder is similar to 
acute stress disorder, except that acute stress disorder generally begins 
immediately after the trauma and lasts from three days to one month, 
whereas post-traumatic stress disorder can manifest up to six months after 
the trauma and last for longer than one month.38 
Mood disorders are emotional disturbances consisting of lengthened 
periods of excessive sadness, excessive joyfulness, or both, and are identified 
as depressive or bipolar.39  A psychiatrist diagnoses a mood disorder when 
sadness or elation is overly intense and persistent, significantly impairs the 
individual’s capacity to function, and is accompanied by various other 
symptoms.40  In such scenarios, intense sadness is called depression, and 
intense elation is called mania.41  Depressive disorders are characterized by 
depression, whereas bipolar disorders are designated by varying 
combinations of depression and mania.42  Mood disorders are the third most 
common cause of hospitalizations for youth and adults ages 18-44 in the 
United States.43  Sixteen million—or 6.9%—of adults in the United States 
had at least one major depressive episode in the past year.44 
Schizophrenia is a “chronic, severe, and debilitating brain disease that 
affects approximately one percent of the American population ages eighteen 
 
 34.  First, Overview of Mental Illness, supra note 27. 
 35.  John W. Barnhill, Overview of Trauma and Stressor-Related Disorders, MERCK 
MANUAL (2018), https://www.merckmanuals.com/professional/psychiatric-disorders/anxiety-and-
stressor-related-disorders/overview-of-trauma-and-stressor-related-disorders. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  John W. Barnhill, Acute Stress Disorder (ASD), MERCK MANUAL (2018), https://www. 
merckmanuals.com/professional/psychiatric-disorders/anxiety-and-stressor-related-disorders/acut 
e-stress-disorder-asd. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  William Coryell, Overview of Mood Disorders, MERCK MANUAL (2018), https://www. 
merckmanuals.com/professional/psychiatric-disorders/mood-disorders/overview-of-mood-disorders. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Bipolar Disorder (Manic Depressive Illness or Manic Depression), HARVARD MED. SCH. 
(Mar. 2019), https://www.health.harvard.edu/a_to_z/bipolar-disorder-manic-depressive-illness-or-
manic-depression-a-to-z.  
 42.  Coryell, Overview of Mood Disorders, supra note 39. 
 43.  Mental Health by the Numbers, supra note 21. 
 44.  Id. 
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and older in a given year.”45  Schizophrenia may result in deterioration in 
thinking, impairments of social function, and disturbances in perception and 
may be accompanied by severe symptoms such as hallucinations, thought 
and movement disorders, delusions, social withdrawal, and a lack of 
motivation.46  Schizophrenics attempt suicide more often than the general 
population, with nearly ten percent of schizophrenics dying by suicide.47  
Schizophrenia impacts 1.1% of U.S. adults, and bipolar disorder impacts 
2.6% of U.S. adults.48 
More than half of those who experience a mental illness will exhibit 
moderate to severe symptoms.49  Additionally, four of the ten leading causes 
of disability among persons ages five and older are mental health disorders.50  
Individuals living with serious mental illness face an increased risk of other 
chronic medical conditions, and adults in the United States enduring serious 
mental illness die nearly 25 years earlier than those without serious mental 
illnesses, largely due to treatable medical conditions.51 
Part II: Involuntary Commitment 
Involuntary commitment, though sometimes required for those who are 
particularly dangerous to themselves or others, is hardly the only treatment 
option for individuals who suffer from mental illness.52  In fact, evidence 
shows that facilities are largely lacking to house all (or even most) of the 
individuals enduring mental health problems.53  Thus, important economic 
limitations exist to the government simply “locking up” every individual the 
government believes to be suffering from mental illness.54  Regardless, a 
large number of individuals face the possibility of commitment, which may 
give the government a concerning power: to impose commitment on 
 
 45.  Samantha M. Caspar & Artem M. Joukov, The Implications of Marijuana Legalization 
on the Prevalence and Severity of Schizophrenia, 28 HEALTH MATRIX 175, 179 (2018).  
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Mental Health by the Numbers, supra note 21. 
 49.  First, Overview of Mental Illness, supra note 27. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Mental Health by the Numbers, supra note 21. 
 52.  Mental Health Treatment & Services, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS (2019), 
https://www.nami.org/learn-more/treatment.  
 53.  Experts questioned by the Treatment Advocacy Center estimate that approximately 50 
beds per 100,000 individuals would meet mental health needs for acute and long-term care.  
However, many individuals who need residential treatment cannot obtain it, because in some states, 
the number of available beds is as low as five beds per 100,000 people.  Nationwide, approximately 
nine million adults with a mental health condition report having an unmet need.  Yohanna, supra 
note 23; The State of Mental Health in America, MENTAL HEALTH AM. (2019), http://www.mental 
healthamerica.net/issues/state-mental-health-america. 
 54.  Id. 
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individuals with mental illness, sometimes seemingly at random, despite the 
availability of other, less-imposing treatment options.55 
A.  Mental Health Treatment Options 
Individuals with mental illness have several treatment options available 
(including many options other than commitment to a psychiatric institution), 
such as antipsychotic, antidepressant, or antianxiety medication, 
rehabilitation, cognitive behavior therapy, and self-help groups.56  Such 
treatment is provided in a variety of settings, and the environment and type 
of care depend on several factors, including the nature and severity of the 
person’s mental illness, the person’s physical health, and the type of 
treatment prescribed.57  The primary settings for providing mental illness 
treatment include inpatient care and outpatient care.58  Additionally, mental 
health care services are occasionally provided via online and 
telecommunications technologies.59 
Inpatient care is the most intensive level of treatment for individuals 
with mental illness, offering around-the-clock care.60  Inpatient care is 
commonly tailored to patients suffering from severe mental illnesses, such 
as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or substance abuse issues, and who 
require near-constant monitoring.61  Inpatient care involves overnight or 
longer stays in a psychiatric hospital, a psychiatric unit of a general hospital, 
or a residential treatment facility.62  Psychiatric hospitals exclusively treat 
mental illnesses and may provide drug and alcohol detoxification and 
inpatient drug and alcohol rehabilitation services.63  A psychiatric hospital 
may also have separate specialty units for eating disorder treatment and child 
and adolescent services.64 
Outpatient treatment involves providing services similar to inpatient 
care in a more flexible environment.65  Outpatient care permits patients to 
attend treatments during the day and return home in the evenings, rather than 
 
 55.  Mental Health Treatment & Services, supra note 52. 
 56.  Caspar & Joukov, supra note 45, at 179. 
 57.  See, e.g., Types of Mental Health Treatment Settings and Levels of Care, NORTH TEXAS 
HELP, https://www.northtexashelp.com/mental-health-treatment-settings.html (last visited Mar. 
23, 2020). 
 58.  See, e.g., The Difference Between Inpatient vs. Outpatient Care, ALVARADO PARKWAY 
INST. BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SYS. (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.apibhs.com/blog/ 2017/8/18/the-
difference-between-inpatient-vs-outpatient-care. 
 59.  See, e.g., Types of Mental Health Treatment Settings and Levels of Care, supra note 57. 
 60.  See, e.g., The Difference Between Inpatient vs. Outpatient Care, supra note 58. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  See, e.g., Types of Mental Health Treatment Settings and Levels of Care, supra note 57. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  See, e.g., The Difference Between Inpatient vs. Outpatient Care, supra note 58. 
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staying overnight in a treatment facility.66  Outpatient services are typically 
geared toward individuals experiencing mild psychiatric symptoms or those 
transitioning from inpatient care.67 
i. Inpatient Commitment 
Prior to the 1960s, involuntarily committing an individual to a 
psychiatric institution was relatively straightforward, with state laws turning 
on a fairly simple determination that the person required care, permitting 
confinement to be continued indefinitely without ongoing judicial 
oversight.68  However, the deinstitutionalization movement of the 1960s 
brought a national trend to reform involuntary commitment laws, shifting the 
focus to the individual’s “dangerousness to self or others” as the basis for 
civil commitment.69  This trend gained momentum in reaction to a Supreme 
Court ruling in O’Connor v. Donaldson, which held that a state “cannot 
constitutionally confine . . . a nondangerous individual who is capable of 
surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and 
responsible family members or friends.”70 
Current involuntary commitment laws permit courts to order persons 
with mental illness held in a hospital over their objections for a period of 
care and treatment.71  At minimum, these laws are required to address the 
constitutional criteria for commitment and the process of commitment.72  
Every U.S. state has established civil commitment laws and criteria that 
govern when court orders mandate mental health treatment for individuals 
suffering from psychiatric symptoms.73  These civil commitment laws 
address: the length of a patient’s stay, conditions to the patient’s stay, 
whether the state may require a patient to adhere to court-ordered treatments, 
and when a patient may be involuntarily re-hospitalized.74 
Some states permit involuntary commitment when individuals are 
dangerous to themselves or others.75  However, several states now have 
 
 66.  The Difference Between Inpatient vs. Outpatient Care, supra note 58. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Brian Stettin et al., Mental Health Commitment Laws: A Survey of the States, TREATMENT 
ADVOCACY CTR. (2014), https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/mental-health-commitm 
ent-laws. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). 
 71.  John A. Menninger, Involuntary Treatment: Hospitalization and Medications, https:// 
www.brown.edu/Courses/BI_278/Other/Clerkship/Didactics/Readings/INVOLUNTARY%20TR
EATMENT.pdf. 
 72.  Stettin et al., supra note 68.  
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  For example, Mississippi, North Carolina, and North Dakota have the dangerousness to 
self or others standard. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-61(e); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(11); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02(20).  
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broader commitment criteria, which permit the involuntary commitment of 
those who are not necessarily deemed “dangerous to themselves or others.”76  
Two of these broader commitment standards are the “grave disability” 
standard and the “need-for-treatment” standard.77  The “grave disability” 
standard allows an individual who becomes unable to provide for the basic 
necessities of human survival to be involuntarily committed.78  Alaska 
follows the “grave disability” standard, and its law defines “gravely 
disabled” as: 
[A] condition in which a person as a result of mental illness . . . is 
in danger of physical harm arising from such complete neglect of 
basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, or personal safety as to 
render serious accident, illness, or death highly probable if care by 
another is not taken.79 
The “need-for-treatment” standard is even broader than the “gravely 
disabled” standard.80  The justification for this standard is that deterioration 
of general health, psychiatric damage, and loss of the ability to function 
independently are all unacceptable harms that require involuntary 
commitment.81  A need-for-treatment standard generally requires a finding 
that an individual’s mental illness prevents him or her from seeking 
voluntary help, and if the individual is not treated, he or she will suffer.82  
Need-for-treatment laws render involuntary commitment available to an 
individual who suffers from a mental illness, even if the individual manages 
to meet basic survival needs and exhibits no violent or suicidal tendencies.83  
Arizona adheres to the need-for-treatment standard, with involuntary 
commitment available if a person is “persistently and acutely disabled,” 
which is defined as follows: 
‘Persistently or acutely disabled’ means a severe mental disorder 
that meets all the following criteria: 
 
 76.  Stettin et al., supra note 68. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915(9)(A) (2019).  Utah also has a standard similar to the “grave 
disability” standard and provides that an individual may be involuntarily committed if he or she is 
in “substantial danger,” which is defined, in part, as the individual is at serious risk of “serious 
bodily injury because the individual is incapable of providing the basic necessities of life, including 
food, clothing, or shelter.”  UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-15-602(17).  
 80.  Stettin et al., supra note 68. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
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(a)  If not treated has a substantial probability of causing the 
person to suffer or continue to suffer severe and abnormal mental, 
emotional or physical harm that significantly impairs judgment, 
reason, behavior or capacity to recognize realty. 
(b)  Substantially impairs the person’s capacity to make an 
informed decision regarding treatment and this impairment causes 
the person to be incapable of understanding and expressing an 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting 
treatment and understanding and expressing an understanding of 
the alternatives to the particular treatment offered after the 
advantages, disadvantages and alternatives are explained to that 
person. 
(c)  Has a reasonable prospect of being treatable.84 
 
Florida’s involuntary commitment law is slightly different.85  Termed 
“The Baker Act,” Florida law permits judges, law enforcement officers, 
mental health professionals, or doctors to commit individuals suspected of 
having a mental illness for up to 72 hours in a mental health treatment facility 
if they meet certain criteria.86  For an individual to be involuntarily held, 
there must be a reason to believe the person has a mental illness.  
Additionally, due to the mental illness, the person must have refused a 
voluntary examination or is unable to determine whether such an 
examination is necessary and without treatment, the person is likely to suffer 
from neglect or harm himself or herself or someone else in the near future.87  
An individual may be released or referred to outpatient treatment after 72 
hours of involuntary commitment.88  However, if the person is not discharged 
within 72 hours, the facility can obtain the individual’s consent to continue 
his or her commitment voluntarily, or a facility administrator may file a 
petition through the circuit court for continued involuntary commitment.89  
 
 84.  A.R.S. § 36-501(32) (2019). 
 85.  Dan Sullivan, Five Things to Know About the Baker Act and Why It Didn’t Prevent Car 
Attack on New Tampa Bike Family, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.tampa 
bay.com/news/courts/Five-things-to-know-about-the-Baker-Act-and-why-it-didn-t-prevent-car-att 
ack-on-New-Tampa-bike-family_169491866/.  
 86.  Kate Santich, Florida’s Baker Act – A Revolving Door?, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 25, 
2017, 5:10 PM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-does-florida-baker-act-work-20170823 
-story.html. 
 87.  Sullivan, supra note 85; see also What Happens When You Baker Act Someone? FAMILY 
CTR. FOR RECOVERY (Sept. 27, 2017), https://fcfrmd.com/happens-baker-act-someone/. 
 88.  Sullivan, supra note 85. 
 89.  Id. 
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If the court finds that a person meets criteria for continued involuntary 
commitment, the person can be committed to a mental health facility for up 
to six months without an additional hearing or other court proceeding.90 
 ii. Outpatient Commitment 
Involuntary outpatient commitment, also known as assisted outpatient 
treatment, occurs when a court orders an individual meeting certain legal 
criteria to adhere to an outpatient treatment program as a condition of 
remaining in the community.91  Laws for involuntary outpatient commitment 
empower judges to order patients to comply with specifically prescribed 
treatment.92  All U.S. states but five authorize outpatient commitment: 
Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Tennessee.93  In a 
few states, such as Utah, an individual involuntarily committed to an 
outpatient program may be required to attend an inpatient program if the 
individual does not strictly follow the outpatient treatment regimen.94  For 
example, Utah’s involuntary outpatient commitment law provides as 
follows:95 
If at any time during the specified period it comes to the attention 
of the court, either that the patient is not complying with the order, 
or that the alternative treatment has not been adequate to meet the 
patient’s treatment needs, the court may, after proper hearing: 
(1) Consider other alternatives, modify its original order and direct 
the patient to undergo another program of alternative treatment for 
the remainder of the 90-day period; or 
(2) Enter a new order directing that the patient be hospitalized for 
the remainder of the 90-day period. 
As part of the treatment plan, a court may order involuntary outpatient 
commitment that may include participation in therapy, self-help groups, or 
 
 90.  Sullivan, supra note 85. 
 91.  Outpatient Commitment, HARVARD MED. SCH. (2006), https://www.health.harvard.edu/ 
newsletter_article/Outpatient_commitment. 
 92.  Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, HARVARD MED. SCH. (2008), https://www.health. 
harvard.edu/newsletter_article/Involuntary_outpatient_commitment. 
 93.  Stettin et al., supra note 68. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  18 V.S.A. § 7618(b) (2019).  
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medication.96  The outpatient treatment plan may also require supervised 
living and frequent drug testing.97 
B.  Burden of Proof 
There are generally three standards of proof that triers of fact apply to 
reach decisions in court proceedings.  The highest standard of proof is 
“beyond a reasonable doubt.”98  This standard requires that the judge or jury, 
as the trier of fact, be convinced of his or her decision without any 
reservations that would be expected of a reasonable person and is largely 
reserved for criminal cases.99  The lowest standard of proof ordinarily 
applied in court is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, requiring 
only that the trier of fact believe a particular outcome is more likely than 
another.100  The “preponderance of the evidence” standard ordinarily applies 
in civil lawsuits and probable cause determinations in the criminal context.101  
The third standard of proof allows decisions to be made based on “clear and 
convincing evidence,” which is a higher standard than preponderance of 
evidence but lower than beyond a reasonable doubt.102  The latter standard 
can be found both in criminal proceedings and civil proceedings in certain 
circumstances. 
In 1978, the Supreme Court considered which standard of proof is 
required to involuntarily commit a psychiatric patient in Addington v. 
Texas.103  Frank Addington had been hospitalized several times for his 
mental illness, and his mother requested his indefinite commitment due to a 
prior assault.104  Her request was granted based on a standard of clear and 
convincing evidence.105  Addington appealed the decision, arguing that the 
correct standard of proof should have been beyond a reasonable doubt.106  
However, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court, holding 
that because of the “uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis” the standard of 
beyond a reasonable doubt was an “unreasonable barrier to needed medical 
treatment” for many patients who were in clear need of care.107  An obvious 
 
 96.  Jacob Kurlander, Pro/Con: Outpatient Commitment for the Severely Mentally Ill, AMA 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS (Oct. 2003), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/procon-outpatient- 
commitment-severely-mentally-ill/2003-10. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Testa & West, supra note 6. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 442; Testa & West, supra note 6. 
A - CASPAR_ JOUVOK_CLQ_V47-4 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2020  10:11 AM 
Summer 2020] WORSE THAN PUNISHMENT 513 
criticism of the decision is that if the need for care was indeed so “clear,” 
then why would the government fail to prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt? 
 
C.  Uncertainty in Confinement 
 
The Precogs are never wrong.  But, occasionally . . . they do 
disagree. 
– Dr. Iris Hineman, Minority Report108 
 
In 1972, David Rosenhan, a psychologist at Stanford University, used 
ten psychologically normal individuals as confederates in a research study 
and sent them to twelve hospitals across the country.109  These individuals 
gave the hospitals false names and occupations and claimed to hear voices.110  
The individuals were truthful about all other details, and none of them had 
any significant history of mental illness.111  All of the individuals were 
admitted to psychiatric units, at which point they stopped reporting 
psychiatric symptoms entirely, as instructed.112  Regardless, nearly every 
person in the study was diagnosed with schizophrenia.113  Their involuntary 
hospitalizations ranged from seven to fifty-two days, with doctors 
prescribing them more than 2,000 pills combined, including antipsychotics 
and antidepressants.114  While institutionalized, staff commonly 
misinterpreted the patients’ behaviors to fit within the context of psychiatric 
disorders and behaviors.115  For instance, the patients often took notes while 
studying the psychiatric wards, and one nurse wrote in the chart, “[p]atient 
engages in writing behavior.”116  Rosenhan’s conclusions were striking: 
individuals faking mental illness all gained admission to psychiatric wards, 
and after they stopped faking symptoms, they remained institutionalized for 
prolonged periods.117  After the study’s completion, Rosenhan stated that it 
“is clear that we cannot distinguish the sane from the insane in psychiatric 
hospitals.”118 
Such studies are difficult, if not dangerous, to repeat due to the 
unnecessary medications prescribed to the subjects and the uncertainty 
 
 108.  MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002).  
 109.  Morris, supra note 19; Rosenhan, supra note 14. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Morris, supra note 19; Rosenhaun, supra note 14. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
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relating to the duration of confinement, but real-world examples sometimes 
help supplement the findings.  More than twenty years after Rosenhan’s 
experiment, John Montin walked up to a person’s home and announced that 
it “belonged to his ancestors” and that he was “taking it back.”119  Authorities 
charged Montin with False Imprisonment.120  A jury found Montin not guilty 
because of temporary insanity, and the state transported him to Lincoln 
Regional Center, a mental health facility in Lincoln, Nebraska.121  Doctors 
at the Lincoln Regional Center never tested Montin themselves; instead they 
used police records to dismiss him as delusional rather than court reports 
showing otherwise.122  Twenty years after Montin was admitted to the mental 
health facility, a psychiatrist at the facility determined that Montin had been 
taking medication for back pain in 1993 that caused temporary psychosis.123  
The man stopped taking the medication prior to his not guilty verdict twenty 
years earlier, but he was only released in 2013, after spending two decades 
in the mental facility.124  Montin filed a lawsuit against Lincoln Regional 
Center, stating that his confinement caused him to forego marrying, having 
a family, and attending his mother’s funeral, not to mention many of the 
other benefits liberty provides.125  Even a conviction for the crimes of which 
Nebraska accused Montin probably would not have carried such a harsh 
sentence, and accepting a plea offer may have further reduced the loss of 
liberty.  But, perhaps given the uncertain nature of the commitment, Montin 
had reason to suspect he would be released soon given the temporary nature 
of his insanity.126 
More recently, in 2007, Ketema Ross kicked in his elderly neighbors’ 
door, beat them with a broom handle, and immediately called police 
afterward to confess.127  Police arrested Ross and charged him with first-
degree burglary, second-degree assault, third-degree assault and third-degree 
unlawful imprisonment.128  Based on a plea offer Ross received, he would 
have spent three years in prison.129  However, Ross’ crime manifested from 
a mental illness—he believed the attack was necessary at the order of the 
President and the Central Intelligence Agency to stop a terrorist attack.  
Evidence showed that Ross committed the attack despite the fact that he did 
 
 119.  Distant, supra note 19. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Distant, supra note 19. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Ross, supra note 19. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
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not want to harm his neighbors.130  The jury found Ross not guilty of the 
charges by reason of insanity, and instead of locking him in prison for three 
years, the state locked in a mental institution for seven years.131  Once 
committed to a psychiatric hospital in Washington, Ross was diagnosed with 
chronic paranoid schizophrenia, and after taking the prescribed medicine to 
treat the symptoms of psychosis, Ross recovered sufficiently to satisfy the 
staff approximately 84 months after his confinement.132  This lengthy 
commitment was despite the fact that just two years into his confinement, 
Ross no longer experienced psychosis.133  Despite his progress, hospital staff 
required him to remain in the hospital for an additional five years after his 
symptoms subsided.134 
Uncertain and prolonged commitment periods are troubling given the 
number of individuals currently facing the prospect of involuntary 
commitment due to mental health problems.  According to a 2017 study 
conducted by the National Association of State Mental Health Program 
Directors, more than 10,000 Americans with mental illness who have not 
been convicted of a crime—individuals who have been found not guilty by 
reason of insanity or who have been arrested but deemed incompetent to 
stand trial—are involuntary committed to psychiatric hospitals.135  When a 
not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity defense does succeed, it tends to resemble 
a conviction more than an acquittal—the acquitted individuals often endure 
longer periods of confinement, as they are pulled into a broken mental health 
system that can be more difficult to leave than prison.136  In nearly all states, 
there is no limit on commitment duration.137  In the states with limitations, 
such as California, the limitations are based on the maximum prison sentence 
for the offense, but California’s law permits repeated two-year extensions as 
 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Ross, supra note 19. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  McClelland, supra note 9. 
 136.  Id.; Thea Amidov, Mentally Ill and Locked Up: Prisons Versus Inpatient Wards for 
Psychiatric Patients, PSCYH CENTRAL (Mar. 30, 2015), https://pro.psychcentral.com/mentally-ill-
and-locked-up-prisons-versus-inpatient-wards-for-psychiatric-patients/. We should note that the 
not guilty by reason of insanity defense is not even available as separate from simply disputing the 
existence of mens rea in some jurisdictions, something the Supreme Court of the United States 
recently ruled conforms with the United States Constitution. Richard Wolf, Supreme Court says 
states can limit the scope of insanity defense, USA TODAY (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.usatoday. 
com/story/news/politics/2020/03/23/insanity-defense-supreme-court-lets-states-make-harder-prov 
e/2898915001/?fbclid=IwAR0CvCXHZQYbu5V08_-M3Q5Pv2J0ZsXYJLpswtS8Kb0ncS67o64 
YdXFk2xg (last visited Mar. 24, 2020). Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18-6135, slip op. (Mar. 23, 2020).  
 137.  McClelland, supra note 9. 
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patients approach the limit set on their confinement, effectively permitting 
confinement to be extended indefinitely.138 
In 1983, a national study revealed that those pleading not guilty by 
reason of insanity were often confined for twice as long as those actually 
convicted of the same offense.139  “Scant research, conducted decades ago, 
seems to constitute the most recent survey of the fate of the country’s [not-
guilty-by-reason-of-insanity] commitments.”140  Not much is known about 
the confinement of persons committed to psychiatric hospitals by the 
criminal justice system—no federal agency is charged with collecting data 
on not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity patients’ lengths of commitment, 
crimes, or treatment, or otherwise monitoring these patients.141  There is no 
national registry or other watchdog organization that tracks how mentally 
infirm individuals have been involuntarily committed or why.142 
In 2015, Florida had 24 patients who were deemed not guilty by reason 
of insanity and were hospitalized for more than 15 years, and Texas had 27 
such patients.143  Connecticut had 40, Georgia had 43, and New York and 
Washington each had 60 not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity patients 
committed for longer than 15 years.144  In each of those states—which 
exclude thousands of patients that were deemed not guilty by reason of 
insanity—a “significant portion of [not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity] 
patients had been hospitalized for more than two years. Nearly 1,000 patients 
had been hospitalized for five to 15 years.”145  Even more alarming, “[m]ore 
than 400 [patients] had been in for longer than 15 [years].  Of these, more 
than 100 [patients] had been in longer than 25 years and at least 60 [patients] 
for more than 30 [years].”146 
When a hospital desires to release or transfer a patient that has pled not 
guilty by reason of insanity, the prosecutor’s office can demand a hearing.147  
In contesting transfer or release, the prosecutor’s office can compel the 
patient to be examined by a doctor the office selects.148  Even if that doctor 
agrees that the patient should be released, the prosecutor can still contest the 
 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Randy Borum & Solomon M. Fulero, Empirical Research on the Insanity Defense and 
Attempted Reforms: Evidence Toward Informed Policy, AM. PSYCHOLOGY ASS’N (1999), https:// 
link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1023/A:1022364700424.pdf. 
 140.  McClelland, supra note 9. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  McClelland, supra note 9. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id.; see also Jennifer E. Brockman and John R. Chamberlain, Commitment Following a 
Finding of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PSYCHIATRY 
AND THE LAW ONLINE (2007), 35(2) 268–69, http://jaapl.org/content/35/2/268.  
 148.  McClelland, supra note 9. 
A - CASPAR_ JOUVOK_CLQ_V47-4 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2020  10:11 AM 
Summer 2020] WORSE THAN PUNISHMENT 517 
release.149  If a patient does win release or transfer, the prosecutor can 
appeal.150  Additionally, in several states, such as New York, a patient that 
has pled not guilty by reason of insanity is almost always transferred to a 
civil, less secure facility for another undetermined amount of time before 
release.151  All of these steps create a difficult path to freedom for many 
patients.152  In the majority of states, the courts have final review over these 
releases and transfers, and judges commonly side with the prosecution 
regardless of what doctors advise.153 
For example, Cas Shearin, the Director of Investigations and 
Monitoring at Disability Rights North Carolina, recalled a 1988 case where, 
during an alcohol-related psychiatric meltdown, a man shot four strangers he 
thought were demons.154  Year after year, the man’s treating doctors told the 
judge that he was ready to be released.155  The psychiatric hospital increased 
his leave privileges, and he was permitted to report to a full-time job and 
visit a girlfriend with whom he had children.156  Finally, after 21 years of 
commitment and seven psychologists and psychiatrists testifying he no 
longer suffered from a mental illness, the hospital released him, and the judge 
ordered him to submit to random drug tests for one year.157 
According to the former New York State Office of Mental Health 
Forensic Director, Joel Dvoskin, politics can determine whether an 
individual will be confined for a significant amount of time, regardless of 
whether it is safe to release the person.158  “Elected judges, fearing bad 
publicity, may be loath to release an offender into the community.”159  For 
example, a psychiatric hospital released John Hickley, Jr. 35 years after 
being found not guilty by reason of insanity: 20 years after Hickley’s doctors 
declared his mental illness to be in full remission.160  According to Dvoskin, 
the question “becomes one of risk tolerance.  America has become—to an 
extreme level that’s almost impossible to exaggerate—a risk-intolerant 
society.”161  People fear mental illness, even though only approximately 3%–
5% percent of violent crimes in the United States are attributed to serious 
 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  McClelland, supra note 9. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id.; What Happens to The Criminally Insane, After Court, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO 
(2011), https://www.npr.org/2011/11/28/142859813/what-happens-to-the-criminally-insa 
ne-after-court.  
 153.  McClelland, supra note 9. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  McClelland, supra note 9. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
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mental illness.162  Additionally, those with mental illness may actually be 
less likely to commit serious violent acts than the general population.163  
Some individuals pleading not guilty by reason of insanity have been 
acquitted of nonviolent crimes, such as traffic offenses and prostitution.164 
In addition, recidivism rates for individuals who are not guilty by reason 
of insanity are relatively low.165  National recidivism rates for released 
prisoners are above 60 percent, but individuals “who are found [not guilty 
by reason of insanity] tend to go back out into the community, and they tend 
to do really, really well.”166  The arrest rate for persons on conditional 
release, a mental-health parole from the hospital, is less than half of the arrest 
rate of the general population of Maryland.167  Furthermore, a 2016 study of 
recidivism rates in Connecticut for those deemed not guilty by reason of 
insanity determined that the vast majority of individuals are never 
rearrested.168 
Psychiatric institutions are the preferred location for housing 
individuals who have been deemed “not guilty by reason of insanity,” and 
these individuals fill an increasing share of the remaining 42,000 state 
psychiatric hospital beds.169  In Pennsylvania, the proportion of patients who 
were committed after being found not guilty by reason of insanity increased 
by 379% between 1988 and 2008.170  In California, nearly 90% of its 
approximately 7,000 state hospital patients are those who were deemed not 
guilty by reason of insanity.171  Nationwide, approximately one-third of 
patients in state hospitals in 2007 were not guilty by reason of insanity 
patients, and that number is “rapidly expanding.”172  During the past ten 
years, these patients’ medical costs increased from $2.5 billion to $4.25 
billion, and these individuals currently account for nearly 44% of total state 
psychiatric expenditures.173  In Tennessee, there are not guilty by reason of 
insanity patients whom hospitals cannot discharge because they cannot find 
 
 162.  Mental Health Myths and Facts, MENTALHEALTH.GOV (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www. 
mentalhealth.gov/basics/mental-health-myths-facts.  
 163.  Mental Illness and Violence, HARVARD MED. SCH. (2011), https://www.health.harvard. 
edu/newsletter_article/mental-illness-and-violence. 
 164.  Linda C. Fentiman, Guilty But Mentally Ill: The Real Verdict is Guilty, 26 B.C. L. REV. 
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 165.  Lea Skene, What Happens After Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Plea? Story Behind an 
Accused Baton Rouge Cop Shooter, ADVOCATE (Feb. 24, 2018, 1:35 PM), https://www.theadvocat 
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an outpatient provider for the individuals.174  According to an employee of 
Tennessee’s Mental Health Department, “once you get someone into [a 
psychiatric] hospital, it’s hard to get the court to take them back out.”175 
Given the uncertainty of confinement, it is entirely possible that in some 
cases, a defendant with mental illness may perceive it to be to his or her 
benefit to plead guilty (or accept a plea offer) rather than attempting to 
establish his or her own insanity.176  This reasonable belief is because the 
individual may fear indefinite confinement to a mental health institution as 
opposed to a very definite (and sometimes curtailed) sentence he or she 
might receive for a crime.  This fear and uncertainty might be well-founded, 
since in many confinements to mental health treatment facilities on the 
grounds of legal insanity, the standards for obtaining release, the 
representation of counsel, or both are very unclear.177  Hence, the accused 
may elect the evil he or she knows (jail or prison) rather than the evil he or 
she does not know (commitment to a mental facility).178 
In author Joukov’s practical experience, it was certainly easier for the 
government to keep someone involuntarily committed than to prove a 
criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt.  In his role as a Florida Assistant 
State Attorney, Joukov handled several Baker Act hearings.  The training of 
an attorney for one of these hearings consisted entirely of handing the 
attorney a single page of questions to read to a doctor the attorney had never 
met before (and never spoke to prior to the hearing) during the hearing.  
Joukov attended several hearings and read the questions precisely as they 
were written in the order they appeared before a judge, a psychologist, 
opposing counsel, and the client seeking to obtain release.  Despite the fact 
that preparation for these hearings was minimal, and despite the fact that 
Joukov received no instructions for what he should do if the direct 
 
 174.  McClelland, supra note 9. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  For example, when James was 20 years old, he lured a woman into his house for a 
housekeeping interview and subsequently raped her.  When charged, James pled “not guilty by 
reason of insanity.”  He was not sentenced to 20 years, 25 years, or any specific term of 
confinement.  James was not sentenced at all.  His plea did not prescribe or limit the duration of his 
stay.  Rather, James is required to be hospitalized until he is deemed safe to release to society, no 
matter how long that takes.  New York committed James to a state psychiatric facility, and 
psychologists diagnosed him with borderline-personality disorder.  James’ entire “medication” 
regimen consists of “fish oil twice a day, calcium, vitamin D and two Kool-Aids and prune juice 
and Metamucil.”  McClelland, supra note 9. 
 177.  Id.; see also Artem M. Joukov, Isn’t That Hearsay Anyway? How the Federal Hearsay 
Rule Can Serve as a Map to the Confrontation Clause, 63 WAYNE L. REV. 337, 380 (2018) 
(emphasizing the importance of legal clarity); see generally Artem M. Joukov & Samantha M. 
Caspar, Comrades or Foes: Did the Russians Break the Law or New Ground for the First 
Amendment?, 39 PACE L. REV. 43, 99 n.326 (2018) (emphasizing the same). 
 178.  Id.; see also Samantha M. Caspar & Artem M. Joukov, Mental Health and the 
Constitution: How Incarcerating the Mentally Ill Might Pave the Way to Treatment, 20 NEV. L.J. 
547, 569 (2020). 
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examination went off track, Joukov never lost a single hearing.  He recalls 
that most hearings proceeded without any cross-examination, there were 
never any objections, and the hearings lasted no longer than fifteen minutes 
(including the time it took for the judge to issue a ruling).  Joukov is unaware 
of a single appeal filed from one of these hearings, nor could there be an 
appeal in most instances since none of the issues would have been properly 
preserved without objection.  These proceedings were very different from an 
adversarial jury trial, which is at least afforded to every Florida individual 
accused of a high crime or misdemeanor and which often incorporates 
objections, cross-examination, and even appeals.  The Article leaves it to the 
readers to decide for themselves whether this Baker Act procedure and 
similar procedures in other states fully and properly protect the constitutional 
rights of the individual seeking release.179 
Part III: Constitutionality 
In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled in Jones v. United States that it was 
not a due process violation to commit not guilty by reason of insanity 
defendants automatically and indefinitely to a mental hospital.180  In Jones, 
Michael Jones, a paranoid schizophrenic, had been committed to a mental 
hospital since 1975 for eight years after pleading not guilty by reason of 
insanity to petty larceny for attempting to steal a jacket, a misdemeanor 
punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one year.181  The Superior 
Court of the District of Columbia found Jones not guilty by reason of 
insanity, committing him to a mental hospital.182  At Jones’ subsequent 50-
day hearing, the court found that he suffered from a mental illness and 
determined that he was considered a danger to himself or others.183  The 
Court held a second release hearing after Jones had been hospitalized for 
more than one year—the maximum period he could have spent in prison had 
he been convicted.184 
Jones demanded that he be released, and the Superior Court denied his 
release, continuing his commitment, a ruling ultimately affirmed by the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme 
Court.185  According to the Supreme Court, when a criminal defendant 
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime 
 
 179.  See, e.g., Mental Health Commitment Laws: A Survey of the States, TREATMENT 
ADVOCACY CENTER (2014), https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/2014-
state-survey-abridged.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2020). 
 180.  463 U.S. 354 (1983). 
 181.  Id. at 359.  
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. at 360. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. at 354, 370; Jones v. United States, 396 A.2d 183, 1978 D.C. App. LEXIS 585.  
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by reason of insanity, the United States Constitution permits the government, 
on the basis of the insanity judgment, to confine him to a mental hospital 
“until such time as he has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to 
himself or society.”186  Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]here 
simply is no necessary correlation between the length of the acquittee’s 
hypothetical criminal sentence and the length of time necessary for his 
recovery.”187 
This decision appeared to deviate from the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence.188  For example, in O’Connor v. Donaldson, the Supreme 
Court held that non-dangerous individuals could not be confined against 
their will at all.189  However, the Jones decision seemed to run contrary to 
O’Connor’s reasoning despite the fact that committing a crime is not an 
inherently dangerous act.190  Examples of non-dangerous crimes include 
small-time theft, the recreational use of mild drugs (such as cannabis), and 
trespass that does not involve danger or threat of danger to the trespasser or 
others.191  These crimes, while constituting a nuisance, surely do not suggest 
a dangerous perpetrator in the vast majority of instances.192  According to 
Jones, however, if someone accused of trespass invokes the insanity 
defense,193 the individual could be confined indefinitely until he or she 
overcomes his or her illness.194 
Although the Supreme Court later clarified Jones in Foucha v. 
Louisiana, the potential chilling effect on insanity defenses was not 
necessarily an abdicated possibility.195  In Foucha, the Supreme Court held 
that potential future danger was insufficient cause, on its own, to keep a 
person committed after a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdict.196  
Theoretically, this would reduce the chance of a person remaining in 
commitment beyond the necessary time.197  Practically, though, even 
Supreme Court rulings such as this one reach only as far as individuals are 
 
 186.  Jones, 463 U.S. at 354. 
 187.  Id. at 369. 
 188.  See, e.g., O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Jones, 463 U.S. at 354. 
 191.  Chris Christie, Save Jail for the Dangerous, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 28, 2015), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/save-jail-dangerous. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  The chances of such a defense being invoked on this charge are incredibly low, despite 
the fact that many individuals who commit petty crimes like trespass may be suffering from some 
type of mental illness.  However, that may be because of the consequences Jones entails for 
individuals so accused: They may correctly infer that it is better to spend a day in jail and go free 
than to remain in a mental health institution indefinitely after a trial.  See Jones, 463 U.S. at 354. 
 194.  Id. at 369. 
 195.  Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. 
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willing to enforce them.  Therefore, if the ultimate decision is left to the 
exclusive discretion of a doctor or a judge, society must rely solely on this 
individual to adequately protect the freedoms of persons with mental illness.  
As demonstrated earlier, this reliance can be somewhat misplaced. 
However, Foucha did not prevent the Supreme Court from adding 
additional post-Jones hurdles to the commitment of individuals with mental 
illness.198  Even when confronted with an individual previously convicted of 
sex offenses, the Supreme Court tread very lightly when discussing the 
possibility of civil commitment to prevent future harm.199  Particularly, the 
Court held that even though the individual in question had more than one 
conviction for sexual crimes, the State of Kansas could not civilly commit 
him after he completed the punitive measures of the criminal charges without 
proof that the offender had “serious difficulty” in controlling his behavior.200  
The Court clarified that this would require more than mere proof of potential 
for recidivism.201  Rather, any state that sought such a commitment would 
have to prove that a psychological condition made the individual more 
dangerous than a “dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary 
criminal case.”202  This ruling put civil commitment in line with general 
concepts of criminal law: that individuals may not lose their liberty on the 
basis of crimes that they have yet to commit (regardless of the likelihood that 
the defendant would commit such crimes). 
However, the Supreme Court has only been somewhat stringent with 
the potential use of civil commitment as an alternative to criminal 
punishment in instances where the government cannot prove sufficient 
criminal conduct to induce prolonged incarceration but hopes to confine an 
individual anyway.203  Particularly, the Supreme Court has drawn a 
distinction between civil commitment and criminal confinement that 
deprives individuals with mental illness of the protections available to 
criminals.204  For example, while Crane prevailed in Kansas v. Crane, Seling 
v. Young showed that bringing a challenge on similar constitutional grounds 
would not necessarily lead to the same result.205  Just like Crane, Young 
objected to his civil commitment after the conclusion of his punitive term for 
several sexual offenses (“six rapes over three decades”).206  However, his 
objections were not on due process grounds but rather based on the double 
 
 198.  Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. at 413. 
 201.  Id. at 407–13. 
 202.  Id. at 413. 
 203.  Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.  
 204.  Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001). 
 205.  Crane, 534 U.S. at 413; Seling, 531 U.S. at 250. 
 206.  Seling, 531 U.S. at 250. 
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jeopardy clause and the ex post facto law provision of the United States 
Constitution.207 
The Supreme Court quickly dismissed these challenges.208  The 
Majority’s analysis went no further than merely stressing that civil 
commitment and criminal punishment were fundamentally different, which 
prevented constitutional protections that the United States Constitution 
afforded to people accused or convicted of crimes from applying to 
individuals struggling with mental health problems.209  This distinction 
between criminal and civil commitment, however, might prove illusory in 
light of the actual challenges faced by those committed.  Evidence shows 
that committing an individual to involuntary confinement is not significantly 
different from a term of imprisonment, except that confinement has far fewer 
limitations and can actually last longer, if not indefinitely.210  Therefore, the 
distinction that the Supreme Court has continuously drawn should not be a 
sufficient justification for failing to reexamine involuntary commitment laws 
both in terms of their substance and their procedure. 
The Supreme Court has certainly used the distinction between 
punishment and other government purposes to nullify arguments about 
constitutional rights violations.211  This distinction leads to a seemingly 
paradoxical outcome: once an individual is no longer in the realm of criminal 
law, his or her rights against detention tend to decrease.  But this creates a 
significant and likely unintended discontinuity in the rights a person has in 
various instances.  First, the Founding Fathers, who were trying to shape 
American government for centuries to come in a relatively short document, 
may not have foreseen the myriad of potential applications of the United 
States Constitution.  It is entirely possible that they intended the Bill of 
Rights to protect people generally, not to address every conceivable instance 
of potential government overreach—an overreach that could be addressed by 
democratic process by the states.  Second, by treating criminal confinement 
and civil confinement separately due to the original government purpose: 
prevention versus punishment,212 the Supreme Court allows reality to take a 
back seat.213  To the citizen confined or incarcerated, the government purpose 
 
 207.  Seling, 531 U.S. at 250; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 208.  Seling, 531 U.S. at 250. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Guy Hamilton-Smith, The Endless Punishment of Civil Commitment, THE APPEAL (Sept. 
4, 2018), https://theappeal.org/the-endless-punishment-of-civil-commitment/; McClelland, supra 
note 9. 
 211.  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (applying Eighth Amendment standards to jails, but 
holding that in the context of pre-trial detention, confinement to jail did not constitute punishment); 
Seling, 531 U.S. at 250. 
 212.  Or the origin of the proceedings launched by the state as beginning in the realm of civil 
commitment as opposed to a criminal charge.  
 213.  See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
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for confinement is less relevant than the general loss of freedom 
altogether.214  Hence, the concern with drawing a distinction between civil 
and criminal confinement ignores the interests of the person most impacted 
by the government action. 
It is important to note that actual loss of freedom triggers additional 
protections in the criminal world.215  The federal right of indigent defendants 
to be represented by court-appointed counsel applies only if the proceedings 
carry a possibility of incarceration.216  The federal right to receive a jury trial 
only attaches when the possible length of incarceration exceeds six 
months.217  Yet limiting all of these rights to criminally implicated 
individuals while refusing to extend them to individuals who may not have 
even committed a crime seems obviously unjust.  The reason the United 
States Constitution draws such a distinction may be because the Founding 
Fathers may not have contemplated high rates of civil commitments on 
grounds of mental illness in a time when psychology and mental illness were 
not well-understood.218  However, for such a distinction to continue into the 
twenty-first century would constitute a willful disregard for the problems 
individuals with mental illness face.219 
State and federal legislatures can certainly address this problem without 
court involvement by promulgating statutes that extend criminal rights to 
individuals with mental illness facing prolonged commitment.  States may 
even go further, seeking to amend their respective constitutions to reflect 
these rights.  In fact, the states or the federal legislature may even attempt to 
amend the United States Constitution, though such an amendment may prove 
particularly unlikely in such a divided time in our nation’s history.220  
However, it may be that a fair look at criminal rights and an extending 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would cure the problem within 
the courts, even if state and federal legislatures offer no solution. 
The Supreme Court could view the current refusal to extend the rights 
enjoyed by criminal defendants to persons with mental illness as a violation 
 
 214.  See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 213. 
 215.  Criminal Rights: Laws and Protections, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEGREE SCHOOLS, 
https://www.criminaljusticedegreeschools.com/criminal-justice-resources/criminal-rights-laws-
and-protections/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2020). 
 216.  The Right to a Public Defender, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/criminal/ procedure/ 
miranda-rights/right-to-public-defender/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
 217.  The Right to a Jury Trial, FINDLAW, https://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-rights/the- 
right-to-a-jury-trial.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
 218.  See History of Psychology (387 BC to Present), ALLPSYCH, https://allpsych.com/time 
line/; see also Timeline: The Development of Psychology, GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2009, 7:01 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/ 2009/mar/07/timeline-psychology-history. 
 219.  Kaufman, supra note 15. 
 220.  The Amendment Process, HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, https://www.tru 
manlibrary.gov/education/three-branches/amendment-process (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
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of equal protection principles.221  Surely, if a state extends certain rights to 
individuals that committed a crime, it must extend these rights to innocent or 
potentially innocent individuals facing a similar predicament.222  While 
significant differences may exist between those accused of crimes and those 
facing civil commitment, these differences diminish when it comes to their 
shared interest in their liberty, the ability to receive due process in the 
determination of confinement, and many other traits that relate to the actual 
government proceedings that deprive individuals of liberty and property. 
Admittedly, equal protection principles have “bite” only when similarly 
situated individuals receive differential treatment.223  However, even if some 
individuals with mental illness are too different from individuals accused of 
crimes for purposes of government detention, they are often more 
sympathetic from a legal perspective.  This should ensure that they receive 
greater protections rather than lesser ones.  Even if this entitlement to 
protection is insufficient to strike the differential treatment on its face, it is 
possible that as applied challenges in particular cases might be more 
successful.  This likelihood should be particularly true when coupled with 
due process analysis, which the Supreme Court has previously used instead 
of equal protection and Eighth Amendment principles to protect the rights of 
persons with mental illness.224 
Furthermore, this may be applicable well beyond state statutes and 
constitutional provisions because the Fourteenth Amendment, and its reverse 
incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
fundamentally changed the applicability of constitutional protections in the 
Bill of Rights.225  For example, prior to the passage of the Due Process Clause 
that allowed the application of rights against the federal government against 
state government, criminal defendants would not have enjoyed the same 
rights that they enjoy today.226  Perhaps an argument can be made that 
 
 221.  Equal protection provides: “nor shall any State . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.  
 222.  Alan Meisel, The Rights of the Mentally Ill Under State Constitutions, 45 LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 7–30 (1982).  
 223.  Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 224.  Mental Health Rights, MENTAL HEALTH AMERICA (2019), https://www.mhanational.org/ 
issues/mental-health-rights (last visited Feb 12, 2019); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001); 
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Foucha v. 
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); O’Connor v. 
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
 225.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. V; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 
(1954); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); United States v. Windsor, 570 
U.S. 744 (2013). 
 226.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (mentioning in dicta that Fourth 
Amendment rights restrict state agents as well as federal ones); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 
(1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) 
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excluding individuals with mental illness facing civil commitment from 
constitutional protections afforded to a criminal suspect violates equal 
protection principles. 
For example, the Sixth Amendment’s preservation of the right to an 
impartial jury trial “[i]n criminal prosecutions”227 could violate equal 
protection if it did not also apply to individuals facing civil commitment.  
After all, the Sixth Amendment treats individuals accused of crimes that face 
incarceration and individuals with mental illness facing commitment 
differently despite similar predicaments (and perhaps a common cause for 
the conduct leading up to the confinement).228  Since the Fourteenth 
Amendment was passed after the Sixth Amendment, it could technically 
overcome its limiting language regarding those who are entitled to a jury 
trial.229  The Fourteenth Amendment was passed in part to ensure that the 
freedoms available to all Americans would be available to recently-freed 
slaves.230  Since then, the Fourteenth Amendment has been extended many 
times by court rulings to protect classes outside of recently-freed slaves.231  
Perhaps its Equal Protection Clause could apply amendments previously 
unintended to protect persons with mental illness, to include individuals 
struggling with mental illness when they face loss of liberty.  This scenario 
would not be the first time the Supreme Court extended criminal rights to 
individuals involved in quasi-criminal proceedings, even if those 
proceedings did not carry the possibility of incarceration.232 
 
(incorporating the right against Double Jeopardy); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436 (1966); Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating the right to a jury trial to apply to the states); Klopfer 
v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporating the right to a speedy trial); In re Oliver, 333 
U.S. 257 (1948) (incorporating the right to a public trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) 
(incorporating the right to confront opposing witnesses); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (incorporating the right to assistance of counsel in capital 
cases); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); 
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) 
(incorporating the right against cruel and unusual punishment); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S.Ct. 682 
(2019).   
 227.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 228.  See, e.g., McClelland, supra note 9. 
 229.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 230.  14th Amendment, HISTORY (2018), https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/fourtee 
nth-amendment. 
 231.  Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643; Wolf, 338 U.S. at 25; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 108; Ker, 374 U.S. at 
23; Benton, 395 U.S. at 784; Griffin, 380 U.S. at 609; Malloy, 378 U.S. at 1; Miranda, 348 U.S. at 
436; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 145; Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 213; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 257; Pointer, 380 
U.S. at 400; Washington, 388 U.S. at 14; Powell, 287 U.S. at 45; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335; 
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 25; Shelton, 535 U.S. at 654; Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660; Timbs, 586 U.S. 
at 682.   
 232.  Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (acknowledging the quasi-criminal 
nature of a character and fitness inquiry regarding the character and fitness of a bar applicant and 
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Of course, such a ruling would turn quite a bit of jurisprudence on its 
head, which makes its occurrence unlikely.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
requires balancing before invalidating prior laws or constitutional 
provisions.233  Generally, if the government can demonstrate a rational basis 
for its acts, then the discrimination is permissible.234  The rational basis 
standard is not a terribly high standard, even though the Majority in United 
States v. Windsor appeared to greatly increase the bite of rational basis 
review.235  However, the distinctions contained within the Bill of Rights, 
such as the right to a jury trial for individuals facing criminal prosecutions 
(but not civil commitment) likely pass this test with ease.236  In fact, if the 
mere argument that individuals accused of crimes receive a particular 
protection unavailable to the innocent was to be applied to the world of civil 
trials, a significant number of criminal protections would have to be 
immediately extended.  These protections would include the right to confront 
the witnesses against the accused,237 the right against Double Jeopardy,238 
the right against Cruel and Unusual Punishment (as well as excessive 
fines),239 and so on. 
The answer to this potential problem is that there is a significant 
similarity between commitment due to mental illness and criminal 
confinement that is absent when it comes to comparing other civil 
proceedings to criminal ones.240  In the past, the existence of such similarities 
has been used to justify extending traditionally criminal protections to the 
civil world.241  The right to legal representation at state cost was ordinarily 
reserved to criminal proceedings, but when the outcome involved truly high 
stakes, comparable to criminal sanctions, counsel could be provided.242  One 
example is the requirement to provide counsel in civil proceedings that may 
 
affording the bar applicant some of the rights afforded to individuals facing criminal accusations); 
see Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners of the State of N.M., 252 U.S. 232 (1957). 
 233.  Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).  
 234.  Id. 
 235.  United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Artem M. Joukov, A Second Opinion: 
Can Windsor v. United States Survive President Trump’s Supreme Court?, 27 J.L. & POL”Y 327 
(2019).   
 236.  Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 502.  
 237.  U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
 238.  U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 239.  U.S. CONST. amend VIII. 
 240.  Ed Lyon, Civil Commitment Used to Imprison Drug Users in Massachusetts, PRISON 
LEGAL NEWS (July 2, 2018), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2018/jul/2/civil-commitment-
used-imprison-drug-users-massachusetts/; Donald Stone, There are Cracks in the Civil 
Commitment Process: A Practitioner’s Recommendations to Patch the System, 43 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 789 (2016).  
 241.  See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); see also Schware v. Bd. 
of Bar Examiners of the State of N.M., 252 U.S. 232 (1957); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Services, 542 
U.S. 18 (1981). 
 242.  Lassiter, 542 U.S. at 18; Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011).  
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lead to confinement due to a holding of civil contempt.243  This requirement 
constitutes important precedent, since civil contempt, much like 
commitment to a mental health treatment facility, could be indefinite.244  
Another example is the required provision of counsel when sufficiently 
complex civil proceedings commence to fully terminate parental rights.245  
Presumably, because the loss of parental rights is so significant that many 
would prefer a wide array of criminal sanctions to this outcome, the 
protections afforded to the criminally accused become extended to the 
defendant in this type of complex civil proceeding (albeit under due process 
principles rather than equal protection principles, though these are not 
altogether separable).246 
These similarities should open the door to the argument that civil 
commitment for mental health reasons, due to its prolonged and indefinite 
nature, inherently includes greater loss of liberty and potential suffering than 
a definite criminal sentence.247  Hence, if individuals accused of crimes 
receive the protections of a jury trial and a heightened burden of proof,248 so 
should individuals whose only “crime” might be that they are sufficiently 
unfortunate to be stricken with mental illnesses.  This would, of course, entail 
protections similar to representation by counsel, which many states already 
provide even without a Supreme Court ruling to that effect.249 
It is true that the Supreme Court could also use the Due Process Clause 
to achieve this outcome.250  This process would certainly be consistent with 
its precedent that extends other rights to persons with mental illness and to 
individuals facing legal deprivations akin to criminal sanctions.251  However, 
the analysis, ultimately, is a comparative one, which might make the Equal 
Protection Clause (and its implicit reverse-incorporation in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment) a potentially more appropriate instrument 
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 245.  Lassiter, 542 U.S. at 18 (The court stated that Lassiter would not be entitled to appointed 
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in the Supreme Court’s toolbox.252  What is most important, though, is that 
the Supreme Court set aside its distinction between individuals accused of 
criminal conduct and individuals facing almost identical predicaments in the 
civil context.253  These distinctions prevent the application of the Eighth 
Amendment, as well as other constitutional protections, to individuals that, 
from a practical perspective, should be entitled to them.254 
If constitutional rights were designed to protect Americans from actual 
infringements by the government rather than theoretical ones, then 
distinctions like this do not help.255  The individual impacted by government 
action rarely cares about his or her theoretical predicament but concerns 
himself or herself with the practical one.256  Of course, an important textual 
argument is that the United States Constitution should be applied as written, 
not as society would want it to be written, to exclude government intrusions 
society dislikes.257  If the intrusion is so inconsistent with Americans’ 
perception of their rights, then the option of amending the United States 
Constitution always exists, and the lack of such an amendment signifies a 
refusal to grant the courts authority to extend certain rights to certain 
individuals.258 
These arguments may be consistent in many ways, but they should 
consider the Fourteenth Amendment, likely one of the most influential 
amendments in constitutional law.259  The text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and its passage after other amendments, should lead its 
interpretation to be that of modifying the language of prior amendments to 
potentially include within their protections those who were previously 
excluded.260  If that is the case, then the question of who those older 
amendments apply to under the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process 
Clause principles is non-trivial.261  A case involving the adversity faced by 
individuals with mental health problems might give the Supreme Court an 
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important opportunity to face this question once again.  This Article 
advocates that the Supreme Court approach this question by raising the 
standard of proof required for involuntary civil commitment, requiring 
definite lengths of commitment to be determined, and imposing the 
requirement that a jury reach the commitment determination if the defendant 
invokes the right to a jury trial. 
Finally, it is necessary to return at least once more to the Supreme 
Court’s currently well-established distinction between detention and 
punishment.262  This distinction, largely created to prevent Eighth 
Amendment challenges to pre-trial detention, is problematic in several ways.  
On the one hand, it is a crucial distinction, since equating pretrial detention 
to punishment would imply that an individual held in state custody prior to 
trial has already been punished despite the presumption of innocence and 
potential future acquittal.263  On the other hand, pretrial detention and post-
conviction imprisonment are not very different.  In some instances, the 
convicted individual would be merely sent back to the same jail to serve his 
or her sentence where he or she previously remained in anticipation of trial.  
Furthermore, time spent in jail prior to trial is often (if not always) credited 
as time served, reducing the sentence to be served post trial or plea by the 
amount of time spent in jail in anticipation of disposition.264  Hence, while 
the legal definitional distinction between pretrial and post-trial detention as 
punishment might be required to prevent the legal concept of pre-conviction 
punishment, the practical and legal application outside of this context proves 
dubious.265 
At the intersection of mental health and the law, the Eighth Amendment 
can play two important roles.  If applied to civil detentions due to their 
similarities to punishment (through equal protection principles or on its 
face), the Eighth Amendment can prevent indefinite or practically indefinite 
commitments of individuals who have not, through their criminal acts, 
justified such commitments.  Furthermore, the Eighth Amendment could be 
used to eliminate the “prosecution” of individuals with mental illness.  Just 
as the Supreme Court once held that it was cruel and unusual punishment to 
criminally punish drug addiction (an important type of mental illness),266 the 
Court can extend this holding to using a civil commitment process to 
essentially prosecute persons with mental illness, generally. 
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Conclusion 
Overall, government leeway to commit individuals on suspicions of 
mental health problems should arouse suspicion and a significant amount of 
scrutiny.  Psychologists are likely improving their ability to diagnose 
individuals with mental health problems, but the diagnoses are not nearly as 
clear-cut as a physician diagnosing a broken arm.267  Hence, while diagnoses 
made with a fair amount of confidence might be sufficient to limit certain 
rights and privileges, that should not apply to fundamental rights such as the 
right to liberty.  Nevertheless, while the Supreme Court has been fairly clear 
that holding harmless individuals with mental illness against their will is 
impermissible,268 the reality is that this ruling has been all too difficult to 
enforce.  Hence, this Article suggests that the Supreme Court expand its 
jurisprudence on the subject to further address the problems at hand.269 
One suggestion involves raising the standard of proof and requiring jury 
determinations in favor of commitment before they occur.  The heightened 
standard of proof would bring mental health commitment determination to 
the level of criminal trials, which is appropriate given similar, if not 
significantly greater, impositions upon individuals with mental illness in the 
event of an adverse ruling.270  The heightened standard may lead decision-
makers to be more careful in applying the law to the facts and might ensure 
that, first and foremost, constitutional liberties are protected. 
The additional jury requirement may also be helpful for several reasons.  
For one, it would raise the effort required by the state to achieve its goal of 
commitment.  Jury trials are often far more formal than bench trials, ensuring 
adherence to the Rules of Evidence and other procedural standards that might 
otherwise be loosened in the presence of only a judge.271  Furthermore, the 
expense of jury trials alone would ensure that state and federal authorities 
act to commit a person only when it is truly necessary.272  Perhaps most 
importantly, though, a public jury trial would allow a significant amount of 
public scrutiny of the process.  This scrutiny may permit individuals to 
escape unwanted commitment and prevent the nightmare scenario of a 
person being committed in a sham hearing by a judge and “expert” who have 
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made up their mind before the hearing begins.  It is unlikely that jurors, 
mostly inexperienced with the system and perhaps sympathizing somewhat 
with the individual, would permit commitments on scant evidence of future 
danger. 
Finally, we propose rules that limit the involuntary commitment of 
persons with mental illness to a definite timeframe.  Courts, statutes, or both 
should require that commitments have a definite end date and perhaps that 
this end date should not extend beyond the time an individual might be 
incarcerated for similar conduct.  Without this requirement, individuals 
found not guilty by reason of insanity would actually face greater sanctions 
than if they had pleaded guilty, which is a perverse outcome that should be 
discouraged.  An individual should lose no more liberty due to a finding of 
mental instability than he or she might upon an outright conviction resulting 
from culpable criminal conduct. 
Whether the procedural changes suggested in this Article come by way 
of constitutional mandate or by statute, they must come soon.  The danger of 
depriving individuals needlessly through an essentially non-adversarial 
process away from the eyes of the public is high, particularly when 
individuals committed against their will might be perceived to lack 
credibility or the power to fight back.  Because mental health commitments 
can result in the same or greater liberty and property deprivation than 
criminal incarceration, the constitutional and procedural scrutiny should be 
no less severe.  Given psychologists’ rate of error in diagnoses demonstrated 
by studies of the commitment of perfectly sane people, heightened standards 
should be expeditiously implemented. In a country seeking to be defined for 
its commitment to liberty, perhaps we should err on the side of liberty when 
in doubt. Extending this principle to persons with mental illness must result 
in reduction of potentially permanent civil commitments due to mere 
suspicion of future health and conduct problems. 
 
